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THE RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR LOSS OF
EXPECTED PROFITS
CHARLEs T. McCoRmiK*
The principles which govern the recovery for anticipated gains
of the plaintiff which by the defendant's wrongdoing have been pre-
vented from accruing, are agreed upon by the courts with general
unanimity, and their mere repetition here would be of little value.
Yet most practitioners would agree that despite this unanimity, the
attempt to predict the outcome of the application of these principles
to any given case is pregnant with doubt and uncertainty. As a dis-
tinguished judge said in this connection, "There is no substantial dif-
ference in the general principles established by any of these decisions,
and the question of ever-recurring perplexity for the courts is the cor-
rect application of the principles to the varying facts of the different
cases."' There may be some utility, therefore, in the collection of a
substantial number of the concrete instances in which the courts of
this state have been called upon to pass upon specific claims for lost
profits, as an aid in finding patterns for comparison when future
claims arise. Having this purpose, the grouping is a purely prag-
matic, and not a logical one, and it is hoped that it may reveal the
court's manner of treating the problems which experience shows are
likely to arise in connection with claims for profits. As it is a cross-
section, it cuts across the categories of torts, contracts, and obliga-
tions imposed by law upon carriers and other public servants.
Unless the claim for lost profits is in the form of some standard-
ized measure of recovery such as the difference between contract
price and market value, it is classed as a claim for "consequential" or
"special" damages, and the specific facts showing the nature of the
expected profit, the probability of accrual of the profit, its amount,
and the fact of its loss, must be particularly pleaded.2
The first main criterion which is usually laid down in the text-
books and opinions3 is one which has to do with the situation before
* Professor of Law and Dean of the School of Law, University of North
Carolina.1 Connor, J., in Harper Furn. Co. v. Southern Exp. Co., 149 N. C. 87, 62
S. E. 145 (1908).
Sloan v. Hart, 150 N. C. 269, 27 L. L A. N. S. 239, 134 Am. St. Rep. 911,
63 S. E. 1037 (1909); American Pure Food Co. v. Elliott & Co., 151 N. C.
393, 66 S. E. 451 (1909).Johnson v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 184 N. C. 101, 104, 113 S. E. 606,
25 A. L. R. 910 (1922).
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the claim accrued. It is the criterion of foreseeability, or as it is
usually phrased, the requirement that the loss, if caused by a tort, be
the "natural and probable" consequence of the wrong, or if arising
from breach of contract, that it should have been "within the con-
templdtion of the parties" when the contract was made.
In contract cases, this requirement is one of substantial impor-
tance, and as a practical matter, properly imposes on the claimant
who seeks to recover for the loss of a profit on some outside trans-
action the necessity of demonstrating that his adversary at the time
of the making of the contract was aware of the circumstances which
rendered it probable that the claimant would lose this profit if the
defendant should break his contract.4 This element of notice is
especially important in actions for delay or error in transmission of
messages by telegraph companies. For example, in Clark Manufac-
turing Company v. Western Union Telegraph CompanyO the plain-
tiff's broker in New York wired to plaintiff asking if plaintiff would
accept "if we can get offer," a named price for a certain class of
textiles which plaintiff had for sale. In fact the broker already had
an offer, but did not disclose it for fear plaintiff might seek to bar-
gain further about the price. The plaintiff wired an acceptance, "if
you can do no better." Both messages were delayed, and the sale
was lost. The court held that on those facts the plaintiff could not
recover for loss of the sale, because the telegraph company had no
notice of the definite opportunity to sell, since the broker's message
appeared on its face to be a mere trade inquiry. Brown, J., for the
court said: "It seems to be an almost universal principle of the law
of damage, imbedded in the jurisprudence of this country and Great
Britain, and adopted by this State by unanimous decisions in many
cases, that under any contract to transmit a message by telegraph, as
under any other contract, the damages for a breach must be limited to
those which may be fairly considered as necessarily arising, according
"Thus, in Critcher v. Porter Co., 135 N. C. 542, 47 S. E. 604, the plaintiff
claimed as damages for breach of warranty of a sawmill engine, the loss of
profits of a contract for the sale of his output, and the court said, "We think
that, in the absence, of any knowledge on the part of the defendants that the
plaintiff had made such a contract, damages resulting from it could not be said
to be within their contemplation."
152 N. C. 158, 67 S. E. 329, 27 L. R. A. N. S. 643 (1910). Compare
Gardner v. Postal Tel. and Cable Co., 171 N. C. 405, 88 S. E. 630, L. R. A.
1916 E 484 (1916), where recovery was allowed for loss of a re-sale profit of
retail dealer on order for cabbages which the telegraph company failed to de-
liver, though the message did not disclose the expected re-sale price.
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to the usual c6urse of things, from the breach of the very contract
sued upon, or which both parties must reasonably have understood
and contemplated, when making the contract, as likely to result from
its breach." In contract cases generally, the obstacle is one that the
plaintiff usually seems able to surmount, especially as the strict rule
obtaining in some jurisdictions that the notice to the defendant of the
special circumstances must be an explicit part of the contract or the
negotiations leading up to itO so as to evidence an implied agreement
to stand the particular loss, does not obtain in this state. It is quite
sufficient here that the knowledge of the circumstances creating the
probability of the particular unusual damage come to the defendant
from any source, before the contract is made. Thus, in cases where
an engine shaft was consigned to a furniture company,T and a saw-
mill-edger to a sawmill,8 it was held that, from the names of the con-
signees and from the apparent vital nature of the machinery-parts
shipped, the carrier was put on notice of the likelihood of the inter-
ruption of the factory and sawmill respectively. Similarly, where
defendant breached a contract to ship to the plaintiff flues for curing
tobacco, the court held that the absefice of special notice that plain-
tiff's crop would be lost without proper flues for curing was imma-
terial, since the probability of such loss was a matter of common
knowledge.9
The underlying reason for the rule in Hadley v. Baxendae,10
limiting special damages in contract cases to those whose probability
defendant was aware of when he entered the contract, seems to be
based upon the fairness of requiring one who knows of special risks
for which compensation might be claimed in the event of the breach
of a proposed contract, to advise the other party of these risks before
the latter has finally bound himself, so that the latter may withdraw
or make new terms in view of the special risk. If this be so, in the
case of an ordinary contract the notice must obviously be given at or
before the time the contract is made. In the case of a carrier, tele-
graph company, or other public servant which is bound by its calling
' See Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U. S. 540, 23 Sup.
Ct. 754, 47 L. Ed. 1171 (1903) ; WILLISrON, CONTRACTS, §1357.
Harper Furniture Co. v. Southern Express Co., 148 N. C. 87, 62 S. E. 145,
30 L. R. A. N. S. 483, 128 Sm. St. Rep. 588 (1908), cited with approval in
Builders Supply and Equipment Corp. v. Gadd, 183 N. C. 447, 111 S. E. 771
(1922).
,Story Lumber Co. v. So. Ry. Co., 151 9. C. 23, 65 S. E. 460 (1909).
Neal v. Pender-Hyman Hdw. Co., 122 N. C. 104, 29 S. E. 96 (1898).
" 9 Ex. 341 (1854).
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to enter into all contracts offered by the public, the rule requiring
notice at the time of making the contract seems to have little reason
to support it, though the distinction seems not to have been generally
perceived. In one case, however, the suggestion, seemingly sound on
principle as applied to these public service contracts, is made that
notice of special damage is sufficient if brought home to the carrier
or other public servant, in time to enable the carrier by reasonable
efforts to avoid a breach of the contract.11
But in cases where the claim for lost profits is based purely upon
a tort of the defendant, not arising from the mere failure to carry
out an undertaking such as that of the carrier or another public serv-
ice company, the requirement of foreseeability loses its significance.
All that is required is that the loss be the "direct" or "the natural and
proximate" result of the tort,12 and this probably means merely that
the defendant's wrongdoing must have been a substantial factor in
producing plaintiff's loss.'3
The greatest difficulty which the plaintiff who seeks to recover for
loss of profits usually encounters is that of meeting the law's require-
ment of certainty. The accepted rule is that he must show, with
certainty, the fact that profits were lost, that is, that they would have
accrued but for defendant's wrongdoing, and did not actually accrue,
and he must also prove with certainty the amount of such profits.
Seemingly the latter requirement, as to amount, is less strict than
the former, and in any event, the degree of certainty required is not
Virginia-Carolina Peanut Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 155 N. C.
148, 71 S. E. 71 (1911).
',"When a party commits a trespass, he must be held to contemplate all
the damages which may legitimately follow from his illegal act. In Brown v.
R. R., 544 Wis., 354, it is said: 'The general rule is that the party who com-
mits a trespass or other wrongful act is liable for all the direct injury re-
sulting from such act, although such resulting injury could not have been
contemplated as the result of the act done.' Judge Christiancy, in Allison
v. Chandler, 11 Mich., at p. 561, says: 'It is urged by counsel for the defendant
that damages for the loss of profits ought not to be allowed, because they could
not have been within the contemplation of the defendant. Whether; as a
matter of fact, this is likely to have been true, we do not deem it important
to inquire. It is wholly immaterial whether the defendant in committing the
trespass actually contemplated this, or any other species of damage, to the
plaintiff. It is a consideration which is confined entirely to cases of contracts,
when the question is, what was the extent of the obligation in this respect,
which both parties understood to be created by the contract. But when a party
commits a trespass, he must be held to contemplate all the damages which may
legitimately flow from its illegal act.' Stevens v. Dudley, 56 Vt., 158," John-
son v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 140 N. C. 577-78.
GREEN, THE RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE, Ch. 5, §1.
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that of a mathematical proof, but only a reasonable certainty.14 Ob-
viously, absolute certainty of demonstration that a profit expected in
future would have actually been realized could almost never be at-
tained, and a wrongdoer should not be allowed to insist upon an ideal
and impractical standard of proving.what would have been the results
of an enterprise which his wrong has frustrated.15 All he can insist
upon, and all the law requires is that it be proved, with such certainty
as men will act upon in their daily affairs, that a loss has occurred,
and that in measuring the loss the court or jury should not resort to a
mere guess, but should be guided by some rational standard.'6 Con-
sequently, the process of development of this branch of the law of
damages as in so many other parts of that subject, becomes chiefly a
search for reliable standards by which to measure the profits claimed
to have been lost.
Naturally, little difficulty is encountered when the profit lost is
one which would have accrued to the plaintiff directly from the very
contract with the defendant, as where the defendant's breach con-
sists in the repudiation of a contract whereby he was to pay the plain-
tiff for services to be performed. Here the defendant is liable for
the price he agreed to pay, less the anticipated cost of performance
by the plaintiff. - This was held to be the measure of damages in Old-
ham v. Kerchner"7 where the defendant agreed to have his corn
ground in plaintiff's mill for a toll of eight cents per bushel, but failed
to carry out the agreement. And in Wilkinson v. Dunbar'8 the de-
fendant counterclaimed against plaintiff for plaintiff's repudiation of
a contract to employ defendant to cut and haul certain timber at a
fixed price per thousand feet: The plaintiff repudiated the contract
while it had several years to run, but the court held that a recovery
might properly be awarded on the counterclaim, based upon evidence
as to the prospective payments less the estimated costs. The court,
however, following the usual rule limited the claimant to the "present
worth" of such anticipated profits, and held further that the costs of
the claimant should be estimated as of the time of the breach, irre-
"Davidson Hdw. Co. v. Delker Buggy Co., 167 N. C. 423, 425, 83 S. E. 557
(1914).
" Stephany v. Hunt Bros. Co., 62 Cal. App. 638, 217 P. 797 (1923).
"Winston Cigarette Machine Co. v. Wells-Whitehead Tob. Co., 141 N. C.
284, 290, 291, 53 S. E. 885 (1906) ; and see Johnson v. Atlantic Coast Line R.
Co., 140 N. C. 574, 53 S. E. 362 (1906). These two cases are guide-posts in the
subject in this state.
"79 N. C. 106 (1878).
149 N. C. 20, 62 S. E. 748 (1908).
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spective of what the actual facts as to the later ruling prices of labor
and material during the contract period may have turned out to be.' 9
On principle, this latter holding seems open to some question.2 0 A
recent example of this type of "direct" profits is seen in Nance v.
Western Union Telegraph Company2' where a boarding-house keeper
was allowed to recover, upon defendant's contract to board certain
of its employees with plaintiff at a fixed rate, for the difference be-
tween the expected compensation and the estimated costs. The
familiar cases where the seller of goods sues the buyer for refusal to
accept the goods, where the seller recovers the difference between the
price, and the anticipated cost, or if the goods are in esse, the differ-
ence between the price and the value of the goods at the place and
time of delivery, are likewise to be put in this class.
A larger element of uncertainty, however, is likely to be injected
when the plaintiff's claim arises from the frustration by defendant's
wrongdoing of plaintiff's dealings with third persons from which
plaintiff expected to derive a profit.
In the first place, the requisite certainty may be lacking in the
demonstration that but for defendant's wrongdoing the claimed
profits would have been forthcoming at all. This may well be illus-
trated by three cases, not all involving prospective profits but exem-
plifying the standard of certainty which would be applied. In Walser
v. Western Union Telegraph Company22 the plaintiff sued the com-
pany for its failure to deliver a telegram addressed to him from the
Comptroller of the Currency, as follows: "Would you accept receiver-
ship First National Bank, Wilmington? Bond, thirty-five thousand.
Compensation, two hundred dollars per month, subject to future
modification." The plaintiff alleged that he would have accepted,
and that the office was worth a large sum to him. The court denied
recovery, partly on the ground that the term of employment was not
fixed but chiefly on the ground that no final offer was made in the
telegram and consequently that there was "no reasonable certainty
that plaintiff would have been appointed to the office." In Byrd v.
Southern Express Company23 the plaintiff sought damages for the
death of his son, due to defendant's delay in delivering certain medi-
'Accord, Haywks v. Lumber Co., 149 N. C. 10, 62 S. E. 752 (1908).
1 See WILLISrON, CoxraAcrs, §1339. Compare McCall v. Lumber Co., 196
N. C. 597, 146 S. E. 579 (1929).
"177 N. C. 313, 98 S. E. 838 (1919).
114 N. C. 440, 19 S. E. 366 (1894).
"139 N. C. 273, 51 S. E. 851 (1905).
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cine ordered by the physician who was attending the son, who was
sick with typhoid fever. The medical testimony was that the medi-
cine was necessary and that if it had arrived promptly the chances
for recovery would have been better. The court held that a non-suit
was properly ordered, as the connection between the delay and the
death was conjectural. A picturesque case is that of Newsome v.
Western Union Telegraph Company.24 The plaintiff sent a telegram
ordering four gallons of whiskey which the company made an error
in transmitting, in consequence of which the whiskey did not reach
the plaintiff. He had ordered it pursuant to an agreement with his
hands who were preparing to construct rafts to take his timber and
rosin to Wilmington during a freshet. Without the whiskey, they
:refused to go into the water, and the benefit of the freshet was lost.
In denying recovery, Brown, J., for the court, said: "It requires quite
a stretch of the imagination to conceive that had the four gallons of
corn whiskey arrived at Thomas, the raft would have been properly
constructed, loaded and safely conducted over a heavy freshet to Wil-
nington and the merchandise duly and profitably marketed. Whiskey
is very potential at times, but it cannot be relied upon to produce such
beneficent results as is claimed for it in this case."
Another example of this want of certainty is afforded by a case2 5
wherein a shipper sued a railway company for the latter's failure to
carry out its agreement to present to the Interstate Commerce Coin-
-mission the shipper's claim for the return of an overcharge for
freight. Recovery was denied on the ground (inter alia) that the
court could not know what decision the Commission would have made
upon the claim. In a more recent case,26 the seller of a roller-mill
-for grinding wheat sued the buyer for the price and was met by a
counter-claim for damages for a defect in the mill, and one of the
items asserted was loss of the profits from customers that were driven
.away by the failure of the mill to produce good results. Error was
Assigned to the admission of evidence of a witness that it was "likely"
that he would have patronized the defendant's mill if it had ground
good flour. The court held that the evidence ought to have been ex-
cluded as being too uncertain in nature for consideration by the jury.
- 153 N. C. 153, 69 S. E. 10 (1910).
"Edenton Cotton Mills v. Norfolk Southern R. Co., 178 N. C. 213, 220, 100
;3. E. 341 (1919).
" Sprout, Waldron & Co. v. Ward, 181 N. C. 372, 107 S. E. 214 (1921).
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More complex than the simple problem of causal connection, are
the perplexities which arise in the search for some trustworthy crit-
erion for the measurement of the amount of profits if the court finds
that any would have been realized. A few examples of cases where
the court was unable to find a reliable standard for assessment of
such amount will serve to underline the problem.
A locar landmark which has strongly influenced the drift of de-
cision in this state and elsewhere is the well-known case of Winston
Cigarette Machine Company v. Well --Whitehead Tobacco Company.27
The defendant, a manufacturer of cigarettes, agreed to exhibit and
operate the cigarette-making machines made by the plaintiff, at the
St. Louis Exposition, but failed to carry out the agreement, too late
for the plaintiff to make other arrangements to exhibit. The plain-
tiff's evidence showed the cost and sales price of the machines, their
advantages over others, and the fact that by exhibiting their oper-
ation, it had sold a large number of them in different parts of the
world, but it did not show that it had received any orders contingent
on the exhibition df the machines in St. Louis. The court held that
evidence failed to disclose any basis for the award of damages except
for expenses incurred on the faith of the contract. Similarly, in
Willis v. Branch,2 8 the plaintiff, a lessee of a hall used as a theater
who sued his landlord for taking out the gas fixtures and the furni-
ture, was denied recovery for profits which he might have made upon
theatrical engagements, where the plaintiff failed to show that any
engagements had actually been made. Likewise, in the leading case
of Reiger v. Worth29 it was held that the purchaser of seed rice,
vhich was worthless and failed to sprout, could not recover for the
loss of the crop which would have been made, and that evidence as to
the average yield of rice on such land as the plaintiff's did not offer
a sufficiently certain criterion.2 0 A more recent case,$' reaches a
similar result, in an action by a tenant of a hotel barber-shop against
his landlord for breach of an agreement to furnish hot water for the
use of the shop. The plaintiff after running the shop for only two
= Supra note 16.
94 N. C. 142 (1886).
127 N. C. 230, 37 S. E. 217, 52 L. R. A. 362 (1900).
"The cases elsewhere are divided on the question of allowing recovery for
prospective profits upon unmatured crops. SEDwGcic, DAMAGES (9th ed.), §191;
SUTHEmAND, DAMAGES (4th ed.), §61; 16 A. L. R. 885, note.
. Brewington v. Loughran, 183 N. C. 558, 112 S. E. 257, 28 A. L. R. 1543
(1922).
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months, abandoned it because of the alleged breach. He claimed
damages for the value of the prospective profits of the business for
the remainder of the year's lease. The court denied a recovery for
such profits as too speculative, and said: "But the profits of running a
barber shop are too uncertain, doubtful, and speculaive to be capable
of definite ascertainment. They depended upon many circumstances,
among which are skill, ability to attract and hold patronage, the char-
acter of competition of others in the same business, and many other
contingencies. One man may fail while another prospers; and the
same man may fail at one time and- prosper at another, though
the prospective outlook may seem equally favorable at both times."
The court held that the plaintiff would be limited to a recovery for
the difference between the agreed rentals and the rental value of the
premises. It is submitted, however, that the case is to be read in the
light of its particular facts, especially the fact that the barber-shop
had not been operated long enough to establish a reliable record of
profits, and that the decision should not be construed as conflicting
with an earlier case,32 where for a similar breach of covenant, the
tenant of a summer hotel was held entitled to recover for loss of
profits upon her established business.
Passing to a consideration of standards which have been ac-
cepted as bases of measurement of profits, it will be found that
where the plaintiff actually has on hand, at the time of defendant's
wrong, orders for goods or services at fixed prices, compliance with
which has been frustrated by defendant's conduct, the probable prof-
its on such orders may be recovered.
In Jones v. CallS3 the plaintiffs sued for defendant's wrongful in-
terference with their business of manufacturing and selling patent
tobacco machines. The court held that the plaintiffs could recover
only for loss of profits on the orders they already had in hand and
-not for expected profits on the subsequent continuance of their busi-
ness, which seems to have been an established one, though of a nature
to render its profits speculative.' In Johnson v. Atlantic Coast Line
R. Co. 3 4 the action was against the railroad for its destruction by fire
of the plaintiff's building containing crates and baskets and materials
for making the same. The plaintiffs offered evidence that they had
.a contract with fruit packers to deliver crates, which contracts would
Cary v. Harris, 178 N. C. 624. 101 S. E. 486 (1919).
"96 N. C. 337, 2 S. E. 647 (1887).
140 N. C. 574, 53 S. E. 362 (1906).
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have yielded a profit of $3,500, and that at the time of the fire other
crates with which to fill these contracts were not procurable on the
market. This evidence was excluded in the court below on defend-
ant's objection, but the Supreme Court held that it should have been
admitted, saying that the profits might not perhaps be recoverable as
such, but that they were at least evidence of the value of the contracts,
which, despite some contingencies (such as the solvency of the buy-
ers), were susceptible of practical valuation, and would be valued if
plaintiffs had been selling their business. There was a dictum that
only profits on contracts already made, not those on contracts which
might be made, were recoverable. In Pender Lumber Company v.
Wilmington Iron Works3 5 defendant breached his agreement to re-
pair the rollers in plaintiff's veneering machine, whereby the plaintiff
was unable to fill orders for the sale of 25,000 crates. A verdict for
$750 for the loss of profits upon these orders was sustained.
Where the plaintiff's business is that of selling goods at retail,
and the defendant contracts to sell to the plaintiff to supply plaintiff's
established retail trade, and the defendant fails to furnish the goods,
and the plaintiff is unable to secure the goods elsewhere at whole-
sale,2 6 the plaintiff may, on showing that he would have sold the
goods, recover on the basis of the retail selling price less the cost of
selling, even though he does not show any actual orders from his
customers.&3 7 And, similarly, where a retailer orders goods by tele-
graph and the telegraph company fails to deliver the message, so as to
prevent his getting the goods, it is liable for the retail profit he would
have made3 8
The authorities in most jurisdictions seem to approve, as an ac-
ceptable criterion for measuring lost profits, the record of perform-
ance of an established business (as distinguished from a new
venture), where the business is of a type sufficiently stable to render,
its profits likely to continue on a fairly even level.& 8 9 In North Caro-
lina, however, considerable doubt is cast upon the proposition that the
S5130 N. C. 584, 41 S. E. 797 (1902).
SEDGIWICK, DAMAGES, §197
"American Steel Co. v. Copeland, 159 N. C. 556, 75 S. E. 1002 (1912)
Davidson Hardware Co. v. Delker Buggy Co., 167 N. C. 423, 83 S. E. 557(1914).
, Gardner v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 171 N. C. 405, 88 S. E. 630 (1916).,
*'Allison v. Chandler, 11 Mich. 542 (1863) (jewelry store); Central Coal
and Coke Co. v. Hartman, 111 Fed. 96, 98 (C. C. A., 8th, 1901) (coal-dealer) ;
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U. S. 359, 47 Sup.
Ct. 400, 71 L. Ed. 684 (1927) (photographers' supplies) ; Smowicx, DAMAGES,(9th ed.), §§182, 182a; 17 C. 3. 795, 796.
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profits of an established business may ever be used as a basis of
measurement of damages, by the expressions used by the court in sev-
eral cases. In an early leading case,40 the court set its face against
the allowance of damages for lost profits on the business of making
patented tobacco machines, and said: "If they were making machines
at the time of the interference, as the referee finds, at a profit at the
rate of $6,000 per annum, what assurance was there that this would
continue, or that they might not make them at a loss of $6,000 the
subsequent year? As was said by counsel: 'Who knows when they
would have stopped, or what misfortune would have befallen them,
or what other patents would have superseded this one, or whether
they could by any possibility have made the same profits on machines,
or would have made any?'" The meager facts do not show how
long the business had been running, nor how stable the demand for
its products, but it may be conjectured that it was a business of a
hazardous and speculative type. In a later case, Johnson v. Atlantic
Coast Line R. Co.,41 the plaintiff sued for the destruction of his
crate factory by fire. On appeal, the court had before it only the
question of whether evidence of loss of profits on particular orders
which the plaintiff had in hand was competent, but the case served
as the text for a general discussion of lost profits. In an earlier part
of the opinion the court quoted with seeming approval the following
statement from a text-writer :42 "If a regular and established business
is wrongfully interrupted, the damage thereto can be shown by prov-
ing the usual profits for a reasonable time anterior to the wrong com-
plained of." But in a later part of the opinion, said: "The jury hav-
ing found that plaintiff's factory was destroyed by the negligence of
defendant, they are entitled to recover all such damages as naturally
and proximately flow from the trespass-the value of the contract in
the light of the facts proposed to be shown by the question asked the
witness should be considered as coming within the rule. This, of
course, excludes any evidence in regard to profits not covered by con-
tracts. They would be speculative. There might be no demand for
crates, prices might decline, a short crop of berries might decrease
the demand or a large crop enhance it. These and many other con-
tingencies not remote, would enter into the problem, which would
render any conclusion unreliable and unsatisfactory." So, in the
o Jones v. Call, supra note 33.
" Supra note 16.
' SUTHERLAND, DAMAGES, §70.
THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
case of a "mill,"'43 a flour-mill,44 a furniture-factory," where in each
instance an interruption had been caused by a delay in delivering
machinery, the plaintiff was restricted to the recovery of legal inter-
est on the capital invested, pay of idle hands, and other expenses dur-
ing the period of interruption. .On the other hand, in Cary v'.
Harris,46 already referred to, in which damages for loss of profits
were awarded to the keeper of a summer hotel, the result was placed
in part on the ground that it was an "established business."147 Like-
wise, in Harrell v. Brinkley,48 where the defendant contracted to
permit plaintiff to operate a sawmill on defendant's premises, and
plaintiff established a mill there, and defendant wrongfully interfered
so as to force its discontinuance, it was held that plaintiff might re-
cover the value of the business destroyed and that its past profits as
an "established business" were evidence of such value. A survey of
the decisions, therefore, leads one to conclude that in spite of some
adverse holdings and expressions in the past, the court is likely to
follow the orthodox practice in this respect of using past profits of
an established business, where it is of sufficiently stable character, as
evidence of, if not as a measure of, the loss.
In a case where loss of profits is decided to be a proper element
of damage, care is necessary to avoid a double recovery. Thus it
would seem improper to allow recompense both for an expense which
has been incurred which would be a necessary outlay by the plaintiff
in any event if the profit is to be realized and also a recovery for the
estimated amount of the prevented profit.49
There remain to notice some situations where denial of recovery
for anticipated profits, though avowedly based upon the usual grounds
of want of foreseeability or of certainty, seems essentially grounded
upon underlying notions of economic danger in extending the scope
of responsibility too far in certain directions. For example, a rail-
way negligently sets fire to certain timber. One who is not the owner
of the timber, but who has a contract with the owner to cut the timber
' Foard v. Atlantic & N. C. R. Co., 53 N. C. 235 (1860).
" Sharpe v. Southern R. Co., 130 N. C. 613, 41 S. E. 799 (1902).
" Harper Furniture Co. v. Southern Exp. Co., 148 N. C. 87, 62 S. E. 145, 30
L. R. A. N. S. 483, 128 Sm. St. Rep. 588 (1908) ; compare also C. B. Coles and
Co. v. Standard Lumber Co., 150 N. C. 183, 192, 63 S. E. 736 (1909).
o Supra note 32.
" 178 N. C, at page 630.
""184 N. C. 624, 113 S. E. 770 (1922).
'Bowen v. King, 146 N. C. 385, 59 S. E. 1044 (1907). Seemingly this
-principle may not have been observed in Dorsey v. N. C. Talc & Mining Co.,
177 N. C. 60, 97 S. E. 746 (1919).
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for a certain price, from which he expected to reap profits, sues the
railway for the loss of the profits. He loses. "No recovery can be
had for an indirect, unintended injury to one arising from a tort to
another."50 Perhaps also a recent case5 ' of wrongful ejection of a
passenger from a train before reaching destination, also represents a
judicial limitation on liability for the economic reason of avoiding
too heavy a burden upon public carriers. The passenger sought
damages for the loss of' profits on a logging contract, due to his in-
ability to meet an engagement at his destination with certain laborers
whom he was to enploy. The court held the carrier not liable for
these special damages, because the carrier was not apprized of the
passenger's mission, and hence the risk of loss was not "in the con-
templation of the parties," but the question suggests itself whether
the carrier should be held liable even though made aware when the
ticket was bought, of the plaintiff's mission.52 The economic con-
siderations involved are made clear by the following excerpt from
the opinion: "Responsibility for damages which would include his
failure to realize the benefit of every contract or business transaction
of the passenger thus ejected from a train would render transporta-
tion of passengers too hazardous and destructive in character to be
undertaken by any prudent persons or association of them." An-
other class of cases in which the courts, prompted by a sense of the
danger to the commercial community from a different course, show
marked reluctance to award damages for loss of profits, are those
where damages are sought for the breach of a promise by the defend-
ant to pay or advance money to the plaintiff. While recovery is
usually denied on the ground that the profits were not "in contem-
plation," yet the willingness to infer notice from surrounding cir-
cumstances 53 which obtains in other situations is much less evident
here. Thus in C. B. Coles & Co. v. Standard Lumber Company,54 a
purchaser of a large amount of lumber to be prepared and delivered
by the seller, who was to make partial advances upon the price from
time to time as deliveries were in progress, was held not liable for
interruption of the seller's business due to inability to finance it be-
'Thompson v. Seaboard A. L. R. Co., 165 N. C. 377, 379, 81 S. E. 315
(1914).
" Johnson v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 184 N. C. 101, 106, 113, S. E. 606,
25 A. L. R. 910 (1922).
Compare Southern Ry. Co. v. Myers, 87 Fed. 149 (1898).
"See notes 7, 8, and 9, supra.
"150 N. C. 183, 63 S. E. 736 (1909).
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cause of the buyer's failure to make the advances. In another case,
however, where the defendant agreed to advance money to enable the
plaintiff to take up an option in real estate for their joint account, for
resale, the recovery of the profit which would have been made upon
the resale, was held to be proper.55
Finally, an examination of a large number of the cases, in which
claims for lost profits are asserted, leaves one with a feeling that the
vagueness and generality of the principles which are used as stand-
ards of judgment in this field, are by no means wholly to be re-
gretted. It results in a flexibility in the working of the judicial pro-
cess in these cases-a free play in the joints of the machine-which
enables the judges to give due effect to certain "imponderables" not
reducible to exact rule.56 This is apparent when one compares the
different results of the application of the same general formula of
damages to cases where the defendant is a malicious or a deliberate
wrongdoer, from those in cases where he is merely negligent or im-
provident. It is apparent also in the court's treatment of the situ-
ation where large profits are sought against one who has entered into
a contract under which he himself could only secure a very meager
return, as in the telegraph cases. As has been said, more definite
and mechanical rules would lead to greater certainty, but it would be
the "certainty of injustice."
'Newby v. Atlantic Coast Realty Co., 180 N. C. 51, 103 S. E. 909 (1920).
' Life has relations not capable of division into inflexible compartments.
The moulds expand and shrink." Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N. Y. 236, 241, 135
N. E. 275 (1922), quoted in CARDozo, THE GROWTH OF TH LAW, p. 19. An
illuminating discussion of the technique of judging is to be found in Prof. Leon
Green's article, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COL. L. Rv. 1014-
1026.
